Abu Dhabi’s push into critical minerals is best understood as a supply chain strategy built beyond its borders. Multiple sources emphasise that the UAE has limited or negligible domestic mineral reserves, which forces the model toward overseas assets and the infrastructure needed to move materials to market. In the Abu Dhabi critical minerals market, that translates into investments that connect upstream mining exposure with transport and processing options, aiming to support wider ambitions that sit “life beyond oil.” This also aligns with a broader Gulf pattern: states want agency in long-term industrial planning while hedging between major powers.
Recent deal-making shows how this strategy is being operationalised. In March 2024, International Resources Holding (IRH), a subsidiary of Abu Dhabi’s International Holding Company (IHC), acquired a 51% controlling stake in Mopani Copper Mines. In 2024, Abu Dhabi also expressed interest in investing at least $1 billion in Pakistan’s Reko Diq copper and gold project and up to $2 billion in First Quantum Minerals’ copper and nickel assets in Zambia. IRH also formed joint ventures for iron ore mining in Angola and said it was in advanced talks to potentially acquire mines in Burundi, Kenya, and Tanzania.
Why Abu Dhabi Is Building End-to-End Supply Chains
Supply chain control is a recurring theme across the sources, not just ownership of mines. One analysis argues that controlling mineral assets matters, but controlling how those minerals move to market can be more valuable, and it links this to systematic investment in African port and transport infrastructure. The same piece notes that the European Council on Foreign Relations has documented UAE expansion across African logistics networks through entities including DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports. The investment logic is framed in supply chain terms: integrate extraction, logistics, and access to end markets, especially where conventional capital is hesitant to absorb legacy liabilities.
Partnership structures also show Abu Dhabi’s preference for scalable platforms. In January 2025, Abu Dhabi’s ADQ and US investment company Orion Resource Partners agreed to establish a new Abu Dhabi-based 50/50 joint venture, with an initial $1.2 billion commitment to “secure the supply of critical minerals.” Other reporting describes the same joint venture and notes that it is set up to invest in mining companies across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The Gulf context matters here too: the Gulf states are pursuing ambitions tied to AI infrastructure and data centres, domestic manufacturing for renewables and electric vehicles, and strategic partnerships with both China and the United States.
Geopolitics is becoming a direct variable in procurement and industrial planning. ORF Middle East notes that China tightened critical minerals export controls in April and October 2025, using licensing requirements, extraterritorial provisions, and end-use restrictions that can hit Gulf development strategies. The same source stresses that Gulf cooperation with Washington should not be read as decoupling from China, but as diversification rather than substitution. In parallel, regional research highlights that the Arabian Peninsula is diversifying mining and mineral processing as a “third pillar,” and flags vulnerabilities tied to geology and processing technology. Against that backdrop, Abu Dhabi’s approach focuses on external resource access, financial firepower, and logistics-enabled routes to market.
What is driving the Abu Dhabi critical minerals market strategy?
What was the ADQ-Orion joint venture, and how much capital was committed?
Which 2024 investments and targets were linked to Abu Dhabi’s critical minerals push?
How does logistics fit into Abu Dhabi’s minerals strategy in Africa?
How are US-China dynamics affecting Gulf critical minerals plans?
